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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ETHEL FORREST 
Plaintiff and .Appellant 
-vs.-
GEORGE E. · EASON, BETH Case No. 7891 
EASON, his wife, GEORGE A. WIL-
SON, MYRTLE R. WILSON, his 
wife, doing business of UT.AH D·RUG-
LESS HEALTH CLINIC 
Defendants and Respondents 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff brought this action against all of these de-
fendants, alleging that defendants were associated to.; 
gether in the op·eration of a business known as the Utah 
Drugless Health Clinic and that said defendants acting 
through defendant, George E. Eason, a duly licensed 
naturopathic physician, entered into an agreement with 
plaintiff for a diagnosis and treatment of her illness. 
It was furthe~r alleged that defendants negligently, un- . 
skillfully and without ordinary care, skill and knowledge~ 
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illegally injected into plaintiff various fluids and that on 
December 27, 1950, did inject a liquid into plaintiff's 
body which caused plaintiff to suffer a convulsion with 
the result of cerebral vascular accident. 
The case was tried before a jury and at the conclu-
sion of plaintiff's case a verdict was directed against the 
plaintiff upon the ground that the plaintiff had failed to 
show any negligent act or omission on the part of defend-
ants which was a proximate cause of any injury plaintiff 
may have suffered. 
FACTS 
While the appellant does not raise the point in her 
brief, it may be well to dispose of the liability of the de-
fendants, other than George Eason, before discussing the 
other evidence in the case. There was no eviden~e that any 
of the defendants, except George A. Wilson and George 
Eason, had ever had any connection with the Utah Drug-
less Health Clinic. George A. Wilson and George Eason 
had at one time been partners, but that relationship was 
·· terminated two years prior to the trial ( R. 50) on N ovem-
ber 1 and 2, 1951 (R. 8) or during the fall of 1949 which 
was prior to the time plaintiff entered into any agreement 
for treatment (R. 2);. Doctor Wilson had no control over 
the business, did not re:eeive any part of the income, and 
did not treat plaintiff or consuTt with defendant, Dr. 
Eason, on her treatment (R .. 66). There appearing to be no 
question that none of the defendants, other than George 
Eason, had any conneetion with the case, we shall 
adopt the~ style of appellant and use the word defendant 
to refer to George Eason (Appellant's Brief, page 2). 
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The plaintiff, Ethel Forrest, was a woman 62 years 
of age at the time of the trial ( R. 96), twice married, 
the second time to a Inan named Johnson (R. 129). Her 
last employment 'vas in the capacity of a cleaning lady at 
the Kearns Building where she was employed for six 
years (R. 96-97). She had an arthritic condition for about 
4 years as far as she knows (R. 130). In Ap·ril of 1949 
the condition became so severe that she had to quit work 
at the Kearns Building (R. 98-130). From that time to 
the time of trial she had no:t secured other employment. 
She apparently discussed her condition with a Wil-
liam Lloyd who recommended Dr. Eason to her (R. 101). 
In response to a call from plaintiff's sister, a Mrs. 
Wright, defendant visited plaintiff at her home on 
August 3, 1950. Defendant diagnosed her condition as 
arthritis (R. 21-102) and an agreement was made for 
treatments to start August 4, 19·50 at" Dr. Eason's office. 
On August 4, 1950 plaintiff report_ed to defendant's office. 
The treatment consisted of manipulation and diathermy, 
instructions on diet and vvays she might help herself at 
home (R. 22). This san1e treatment was continued on 
subsequent visits during the month of August with a · 
little vitamin B1 being given to plaintiff (R. 27). 
During the lllOnth of s.eptember, diathermy and man-
ipulation treatments were continue·d and sine wave and 
galvanic wave treatments, an electrotherapy treatment, 
were given in the vicinity of the knees (R. 29). Treat-
•nent continued on through October, November and De-
<'einber with injections of penicillin being given on Oc-
tober 2, 4 and 6 (R. 35). On November 8, 10 and 13, 
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procaine .hydrochloride injections were given (R. 37). On 
'Novemb~r 17, 24, 27 and 30 and December 4 and 7, 
desoxycorticosterone injections were given (R. 36). On 
D·ecember 11, 14, 18, 21 and 27, vitamin Bl injections were 
given. From December 11 to 27, 1950, the only injections 
given were vitamin B1 (R. 37). 
·The ·c:ab driver, Chris Michaels, who drove a Ute 
Cab and had taken pl~intiff to defendant's office on many 
occasions, testified that plaintiff was a crippled lady and 
required assistance on each occasion. He stated that 
wheri he took plaintiff home from defendant's office on 
December 27, 1950 she was coherent and rational and that 
there was nothing unusual or different about her condi-
tion on this occasion as compared with her condition on 
previous trips· '(R. 144-145). 
On cross examination Dr. Eason testified that vita-
min B1 was injected into the muscular part of the body, 
and was given to relax the system and to build the system 
in order to overcome the arthritic condition (R. 67). 
A galvanic treatment is an e~lectric treatment given to 
relieve tension in the muscles and in the blood vessels 
and joints (R. 67). The procaine hydrochloride. solution 
is used to release tension in blood vessels and is injected 
into the· vein. The desoxycorticosterone or percorten is 
given with vitamin C to build the system. It is a gland-
ular substance used instead of crotisone and ACTH, the 
cost of which would he -prohibitive. to a person of plain-
tiff's means (R. 69). All the tr·eatments given were ac-
cepted p·rocedure or. treatment for arthritis at the time it 
was given (R. 68-70) and there is no evidence in the 
record to the contrary. 
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The appellant in her argument makes much of the 
manner of giving injections and it is perhaps wise to re-
view the evidence in that regard~ Dr. Eason testified 
the only time any difficulty was encountered. was on 
November 6 when when he 'vas giving an intravenous 
8hot and had difficulty in getting in to the vein of left 
arm and so went over to the other arm (R. 45). Dr. 
Eason testified that this is ·a quite common occurrence. 
Plaintiff's testimony in this regard is that sometime in 
November Dr. Eason had to switch over to the right arm 
(R. 109). That her ann was black and blue and swollen, 
but that it healed in a couple of weeks (R. 110). Plaintiff 
testified that the doctor did not have any difficulty after 
he started making injections in the right arm (R. 111). 
There is a conflict of .testimony as to how many in-
jections were given on the last day, December 27, 1950. 
Dr. Eason testified that he gave her one. injection of B1 
on that date (R. 70) ~ Plaintiff testifies to two injections, 
one in the buttocks and one in the right arm (R. 114-115-
116). The arm which she had previously t~stified Dr. 
Eason had had no difficulty with in rnaking an injection. 
The day after New Year's Day in 1951, on January 
2, plaintiff suffered a S'erious convulsion and lapsed into 
an unconscious state (R. 185-186). Dr. J. Edward Day, 
·who has his office in the Judge Building at Salt Lake 
City, was called in, he stated he was given a history of 
the case by p]aintiff's sister (R. 188) and that as he 
studied the case her condition might.be due to ap~oplexy; 
a blood clot, an infarct breaking loose; a trauma due to 
h~·pPrtension which would· cause a contraction of the 
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vessels of the brain ... but the emboli of the bacteriemia 
n'a.ture or a soluble nature that reached the blood stream 
into the brain was probably the cause; and on examina-
tion of the patient, he had seen these marks of injection 
and awhether they were or not, they were said to be peni-
cillin shots, some of them, and tha.t it. is possible that the 
oil in the penicillin could reach the vein and possibly 
through the vein or through the lwng into the circulation 
and the brain. So it was my impre~ssion that it was an 
emboli due to bacteriemia or some soluble subst(JJI'IJce that 
could be injected into the· system, either by bacteria, dirty 
needle, or oil or some~thing of that nature that could reach 
t~e circulation through the lung." (R. 194). 
Dr. Day defined an emboli a.s: "Well, an emboli is a 
portion or particle that reaches the circul'ation and is 
deposited at some foreign point; could be of the lung; 
could be of the brain; could be of the heart; could be any-
where, hut it is a point ... could be blood; could be bac-
teriemia; could he oil; could be fat; could be, anything 
that you might speak ·of as a small portion that was in-
je'Cted or broken off from some part of the body and 
reaches the blood stream and finally finds a resting place 
in other parts of the body." (R. 195). 
The plaintiff was not hospitalized and apparently 
has fully recovered from the effects of the convulsion, 
the testimony being that her condition at the time of 
trial was better than it had been at the time the defendant 
had first se,en her (R. 40). 
There is considerable evidence going to plaintiff'R 
condition before, during and after the treatments given 
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to her by defendant. .. A_ consideration of this evidence 
is not necessary to our discussion here. Suffice it to say 
that an exa1uination of the record reveals that the defend-
ant \vas seriously impaired because of the arthritic condi-
tion and required assistance fron1 a period before thP-
treatments were started and that that condition continued 
up to the time of trial. Other pertinent evidence will be 
discussed in connection \vith the argument. 
STATEniENT OF POINTS 
POINT NO. I. THE STANDARD OF CARE AND SKILL 
REQUIRED OF THE DEFENDANT MUST NECESSARILY 
DEPEND UPON EXPERT TESTIMONY. 
POINT NO. II. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF LACK OF 
SKILL OR NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE DEFEND-
ANT. 
POINT NO. III. THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF'S CONDITION WAS PROXIMATELY CAUSED 
BY ANY ACT OR OMISSION OF DEFENDANT, NEGLIGENT 
OR OTHERWISE. 
POINT NO. IV. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUS-
TAINING ANY OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S QUESTIONS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I. THE STANDARD OF CARE AND SKILL 
REQUIRED OF THE DEFENDANT MUST NECESSARILY 
DEPEND UPON EXPERT TESTIMONY. 
The plaintiff prior to going to defendant was suffer-
ing from a condition of arthritis. It is· claimed that the 
plaintiff suffered a further illness b-ecause of defendant's 
treatment of that condition. It is a matte,r of common 
knowledge that medical science has been trying to develop 
a eure for arthritis for a period of years. Various treut-
7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
rnents have been tried with doubtful success. (See Ex-
hibit·s G. H. I. & J.). As a result ·of these treatments, the 
plaintiff claims to have suffered another ailment which .... 
might h'ave ·been apoplexy, a blood clot, trauma or emboli 
of the brain. 
An· ordinary layman does not ordinarily know what 
the conditions are much less the conditions' which may 
bring them about or the manner in which they may be 
treated. Appellant apparently recognizes this, but at-
tempts to argue that the jury might infer negligence from 
the fact that defendant experienced difficulty in n1aking 
an injection into the vein of plain.tiff's left arm. Any 
person who has ever given a blood transfusion knows that 
the ability to make an insertion into the vein of different 
p:ersons depends upon a number of variable factors such 
as the depth of the vein, to cite only one .. Whether or not 
defendant was negligent again is a matter of expert opin-
Ion. 
In Baxter v. Snow, 78 Utah 217, 2 P2d 257, which 
is only quoted in part on page 53 of appellant's brief, 
plaintiff went to a doctor for treatment of his left ear. 
He testified that the! doctor inserted instruments in his 
ear and nose and that he could hear when he sat down 
' in the doctor's chair for treatment, but could not hear 
when he stood up. l-Ie ·produced no expert testimony on 
the lack of care, or negligence of the doctor. A judgment 
for plaintiff in the lower court was re~versed and the case 
remanded for new trial. In so deciding, the court quoted · 
Wigmore on evidence, Vol. 4, ·sec. 2090 (2nd Ed) : 
"It happens, however, that in one class of 
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cases viz, actions for malpractice against a physi-
cian or surgeon, the main issue of the defendant's 
use of suitable p-rofessional skill is generally 
a topic calling for expert testimony only: and also 
that the plaintiff in such an action often prefers 
to rest his case on the n1ere facts of his sufferings, 
and to rely upon the jury's untutored sympathies, 
without attempting specifically to evidence the de-
fendant's unskillfulness as the cause of those suf·-
ferings. Here the Courts have been obligated to 
insist on the dictate of simple logic, resulting from 
the principle above cited, ( citations) that expert 
testimony on the main fact in issue must some-
where appear in ·the plaintiff's whole evidence: 
and for lack of it the Court n1ay rule, in its general 
po,ver to pass upon the sufficiency of evidence, 
(citations) that there is not sufficient evidence to 
go to the jury." 
In Anderson vs. Nixon, 104 Utah 262, 139 P'2 216, 
Plaintiff based a malpractice action on the failure of phy-
sician to recognize osteomylitis by specified date. A judg-
ment for the plaintiff in the lower court was reversed. Th'3 
court said: 
"No expert testified that had DT. Nixon recog-
. nized the symptoms of osteomylitis, he could have 
alleviated or cured it by using ordinary skill, care 
and knowledge of a physician practicing in that 
vicinity .... Osteornylitis being a disease the cause 
and cure of which is peculiarly within the knowl-
edge of medical men and not a matter of common 
knowledge, it is necessary to have exp-ert testi-
mony on the effect of the negligence of the doctor 
·on the end result. In this case there was no evi-
dence that anything Dr. Nixon did or failed to do 
after osteomylitis developed caused the end result. 
In the absence of such expert testimony there i3 
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nothing upon which a jury can base its finding 
on the proximate cause of the injury. A jury may 
not conjecture or speculate, but must have sub-
stantial evidence on which to base a verdict." 
In Passey v. Budge, 85 Utah 37; 38 P (2) 712, where 
a doctor broke 'a small piece of a surgical knife during a 
tonsillectomy and permitted the particle to pass through 
the intestinal tract, the court held that the plaintiff must 
meet defendant's testimony that suc:h treatment was 
proper with expert testimony to the contrary. 
As was said in Baxter v. Snow, Supra, which was 
reversed because no expert testimony was given, the court 
did concede : 
"A treatment may so plainly indicate that 
the physician or surgeon wa;s negligent, or that 
the act done or failed to be done so obviously did 
not involve . skill, as not to require any opinion 
of an expert as to· the performance or non-per-
formance of the act." 
Appellant cites examples of such cases in her brief: 
Where. a chirop~ra.ctor fractured plaintiff's 12th rib while 
tre'ating her-Morrison v. Lane, 52 P2 530. Where a 
chiropractor roughly jerked plaintiff's head causing a 
partial paralysis of the. hody-Furrah v. Patton, 59 P2d 
76. And whe,re a chiropractor thrust his thumb between 
the shoulder blades of a patient with such vio~ence as to 
dislocate plaintiff's ribs-Hinthorn v. Garrison (Kan.) 
196 P. 439. 
The ca:se at bar does not involve any condition so 
simple as dislocating a rib while tre~ating a patient or 
leaving a sponge in an operation. It is submitted that the 
10 
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n1atters under consideration are so peculiarly within the 
kno\Yledge of medicine that to permit the: jury to involve 
their own conclusion 'vould be to allow them to indulge 
in conjecture and specula;tion. 
POINT NO. II. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF LACK OF 
SKILL OR NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE DEFEND-
ANT. 
Appellant asserts that there were admissions of 
defendant, Eason, and expert testimony. of injury to the 
plaintiff to take the case to the jury without indicating 
any evidence upon which he relies. 
It has frequently been held by this court that the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, that negligence might be 
inferred from the injury, does not apply ~o m·alpractice 
actions and that negligence of defendant must be show:n 
affirmatively, mere possibility of negligence: not being 
sufficient. (Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 92 Utah 312, 67 P. 
(2) 654) (Baxter v. Snow, sup·ra.) (Jackson v. Colston, 
116 U. 299, 209 P 2d 566) In the case at bar there· is no 
evidence that the diagnosis of the defendant, that is, that 
plaintiff had arthritis, was incorrect. In fact the evidence 
sustains this diagnosis. There wa:s no evidence that 
the treatments given by the d~fendant were not the ap-
proved methods of treatment. T'he·re was no evide·nce 
that any of the drugs or injections given should not have 
heen given or ·that defendant did not take. adequate pre-
cautions to insure· that the substances. used in said in-
jertions were not properly selected and prepared. 
The cases cited by app·e·llant do not stand for the. 
proposition that defendant does not have the~ burden of 
11 
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showing negligence, hut merely go to the degree: of proof 
required. In James v. Robertson, 39 Utah 414, 117 p. 
1068, the evidence was that plaintiff had gone to defend-
ant to have a cist removed. The defendant had used a 
caustic solution and may have dropped some in her eye 
causing blindness. A doctor testified the injury to the· 
eye could have been caused by the caustic solution or 
some other foreign substance. There was no evidence of 
any othe-r foreign substance getting into her eye. The 
court held the jury might find from that evidence that 
defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of plain-
tiff's injury. In Peterson v. Richards., 73 Utah 59, 272 
P. 229, plaintiff's evidence, coupled with admission of 
defendant, was consistent with the· theory that defendant 
had crushed plaintiff's. hand by manipulation. of an op-
erating table. In J·a_ckson v. Colston, 11_6 Utah 299, 209 
P2 566, the majority of the court held, contrary to J usti.ce 
Wade and Justice Wolf, that the fac~ that plaintiff was 
injured did not give rise to -a presumption that she w-as 
injured by ·defendant in the absence~ of proof that defend-
ant was negligent or that such negligence was the proxi-
mate cause of injury to plaintiff. 
As has been pointed out there is no evidence of lack 
of due care in defendant's diagnosis of plaintiff's condi-
tion or his method or manner of trea:ting the srune. Ap-
pellant assumes, without basis either in fact or in law, 
that the diagnosis and treatment of the defendant were 
unauthorized. 
The practice of medicine is defined by statute Sec-
tion 79-9-17, Utah Code Annotated 1943, as follows: 
12 
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" .. Any person who shall diagnose, treat or p~ro­
fess to treat, or prescribe or advise, for, any physi-
cal or mental ailment of, or any physi,cal injury to, 
or any deformity of, another: or \vho shall operate 
upon another for any aihnent, injury or deforln-
ity, shall be regarded as practicing medicine or 
treating hu1nan ailments." 
There are four kinds of license to practice given in 
the State of Utah (79-9-3, Utah Code Annotated 1943). 
The following classes of license shall be is-
sued: 
(1) To practice n1edicine and surgery in all 
branches thereof. 
(2) (a) To practice as an osteopathic phy-
sician without operative surgery. in accordance 
with the tenents of a p-rofessional school of osteo-
pathy recognized by the department of registra-
tion. 
(b) To practice as an osteopathic physician 
and surgeon in accordance with the tenents of a 
professional school of osteopathy recognized by 
the department of registration. 
· (3) · To practice the treatment of human ail-
n1ents without the use of drugs and without opera-
tive surgery .... 
( 4) To practice obstetrics. 
The evidence shows that defendant had met all the 
requirements necessary to· becoming an Osteopathic 
Physician and Surgeon required by Secti~n 79-9-8, Utah 
Code Annotated, including: graduation from high school, 
2 years college wor~ at Santa Monica Junior .Colle~ge, 
Santa Monica, California, four years resident work at 
13 
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the College of Naturopa;thic Physicians and Surgeons 
at Los Angeles, from which he greduated with 5141 hours 
of lectures and 'Class work, and in addition a course of 
training in a hospital, or sanitarium, or office of a li-
censed Naturopathic Physician of the St~te of Utah 
from December 1, 1942 to December 1, 1943. He had 
taken the examination prescribed by the Department of 
Registratio:n and has received a passing grade in all sub-
jects including minor surgery (Exhibit 1). 
There is no question that the defendant possessed 
the necessary qualifications of an osteopathic physician 
and surgeon and the witness for plaintiff so testified 
(R. 63). He has been issued a license as a naturopathic 
physician including obstetrics (R. 55). For some reason, 
unexplained by the evidence, the Dep~~rtment of Re~gis­
tration have held up insurance of licenses under S.ection · 
(2) (b) of Section 79-9-3 Utah Code Annotated 1943. 
It should be noted that Section ( 2) of 79-9-3 does not 
define on osteopath as one who treats without drugs or 
surgery. Sec. (a) says without operative surgery, Section 
(b) makes no limitation. The important part of the defin-
ition is the phrase "in accordance with the tenents of a 
professional school of osteopathy recognized by the de-
partment of registration." As was s.aid in Sta:te v. Glea-
son, (Kan.) 79 P 2d 911, whe~re the court was called upon 
to interpret a statute wherein a board was authorized to 
issue a successful applicant "'a eertificate granting him 
the right to practice osteopathy in the State of Kansas, 
as taught and practiced in the legally incorporated col-
leges of osteopathy of good repute~." 
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H 'V e have no difficulty in finding that our 
legislature recognized the p.ractice of medicine and 
surgeTy as one thing, and the practice of osteo-
pathy as another, and that it regarded both 
schools of healing as having merit, and the prac-
tice of each wa_s authorized. Although founded on 
different basic ideas they seek to attain the same 
objective,-namely, the curing or reducing the 
injurious effects of diseases or injuries to man-
kind. The legislative purp-ose was to protect citi-
zens of the state from those who would attempt to 
acco1nplish such purposes by means which they 
have not studied, or were otherwise unqualified 
to use. As in other sc:hools of thought having a 
common object in view, such a religion or political 
science, while fundamental differences exist, there 
may be ideas or practices in common. Profession-
al men of high standing seldom have serious dif-
ficulty with such details. Our legislature dealt 
with the two schools of healing in terms quite 
general, and that is the vie-wpoint we take. It is 
possible the classification made by the legislature 
is sufficiently definite so that the detailed speci-
fie questions present in the briefs, and others of 
a similar character, can be answered, but if so 
they partake more of questions of fact than of 
pure questions of law." 
In State v. Vvagner (Nebraska) 297 N.W. 906 it was 
held under a statute ·conferring a right to p·ractice osteo-
pathy in all its branches as taught in the _osteopathic 
colleges recognized by the American Osteopathic Asso-
ciation that Osteopathic physicians are entitled to pe.r-
forin "surgery" under provisions of the <?·steopathic stat-
ute, if the surgery is confined to surgery as it was taught 
and used as a part of the osteopathic system of healing, 
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which is in the main by manipulation but are not entitled 
to enter into the general field of operative surgery with 
surgical instruments. 
Thus it is seen that the authority of the defendant 
to practice, medicine depends no!t on any neat distinction 
between what does or does not constitut~ minor surgery 
but is limited by and is to be judged by the fundamental 
precep~ts of the sehool of praetice to which the practi-
.. tioner belongs or, in this case, the t~nents of a profession-
al school of osteopathy recognized by the Departlnent of 
Re~gistration. In.6rder for the jury or trial court to have 
made or for this court to make a determination of 
whether Qr not defendant's activities were authorized 
these "Tenents" must be introduced into the record and 
the record is absolutely silent upon this point. 
·Moreover, even if we should assume any conduct 
of the defendant was unauthorized we are still faced with 
the sarue fundamental problem. As said in McKay· v . 
. State~ Board of Exam1ners (Colo.) 86 P. 2d 232 : 
"If a law inhibits the prescribing of a· drug 
it is of course the duty of a physician to obey the 
law and if convicted of its violation by a court of 
comp~etent jurisdiction he might with perfect. pro-
priety be held guilty of unprofessional or dis-
honorable conduct, if such violation is held also· to 
involve moral turp1itude even though the prescrip-
tion might he entirely prope~r in a case judged by 
medical standards alone. Treatment that is proper 
by correct medical standards does not constitute 
malpra<5tice e·ven though it amounts to a violation 
of law. Malpractice consists of a failure to exer-
cise that degree of care and skill in diagnosis or 
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treatment that 1nay reasonably be expected fron1 
one licensed and- holding himself out as a physi-
cian, under the circumstances of the p·articular 
case." 
Moreover, 've still have the question ·of proximate 
cause, 
HThe great weight of authority supports the 
view that such failure to procure a license does not 
in itself give rise to any right of recovery hut 
only subjects the defendant to the penalty· pre-
scribed by statute .... " 
~'While a failure to comply with the registra-
tion statute would subject the defendant to a cri-
minal prosecution, such failure, coupled with a 
showing of treatment given, is not in itself suffi-
cient on which to base a charge of malpractice. 
To maintain such an action, the plaintiff must 
show that the result complained of was due to 
negligence or unskillful· treatment.'' Willett v. 
Rowekomp (Ohio) 16 N.E. 2d 457. 
It is submitted that there was no evidence of any 
negligent or unlawful act of the defendant in this treat-
ment of plaintiff. 
POINT NO. III. THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF'S CONDITION WAS PROXIMATELY CAUSED 
BY ANY ACT OR OMISSION OF DEFENDANT, NEGLIGENT 
OR OTHERWISE. 
The proposition that, "if injuries could b·e attributed 
to two or more causes one of which was the negligence 
of defendant, it would be a question for the jury to deter-
mine the proximate cause of the injury," is subject to 
the qualification that there must be a causel connection 
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between a negligent a:ct or omission complained of and 
the resultant injury. In all of the pertinent cases cited 
. by the ap.pellant it will be found that the· evidence showed 
a negligent act and a subsequent injury, the later result-
ing. naturally and logically from the former.. A review 
of a part of these citations will ill~strate this fact. 
In Anderson v. Nixon (supra) the majority of the 
court held that there was no evidence of negligence which 
was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. 
In F~redrickson v. Maw (Utah) 227 P. 2d 772 the evi-
dence supporte·d a finding that .defendant in p·erforming 
a tonsillectomy left gauze in plaintiff's mouth which later 
manifested itself in ulcers which formed in plaintiff's 
mouth. 
In Anderson v. Stump (Cal.), 109 Pa:c. 2d 1027, the 
defendant made, a vaginal ~·xamination of plaintiff with 
his street clothes on and the bed linen was ne~ither chang-
ed or sterilized. Later an infection develo~ed in the same 
· ·area. 
In Jordan v. Skinne~ (Wash.) 60 Pac. 2d 697 a doctor 
failed to sterilize the eyes on a new horn baby of birth as 
required by state laws and proper medical procedure. 
Three days later an infection developed in the child's 
eyes. 
In the case of Jackson v. Colston, 116 Utah 29·5, 209 
P. 2 566 plaintiff brought an aetion to recover for burns 
to her leg allegedly due to heat treatments given by the 
defendant. The evidence showed 'that the lamp used to 
give the tre,atmerrt did not produce enough heat to burn 
pl~intiff's leg. The court below directed a verdict in 
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defendant's favor and this court affirmed the decision 
saying : ( sylabus) 
"'In an action for injuries arising out of anal-
leged act or omission of the defendant, it is incum-
bent upon the plain tiff to prove, first, that the de-
fendant \vas negligent and second tha:t the defend-· 
ant's negligent acts or omissions p·roximately 
caused the injury sustained by the plaintiff. 
" ... the causal connection between the alleged 
negligent act and the injury is never p~resumed 
and that is a matter which must always be proved. 
''The mere fact that plaintiff wa.s injured does 
not raise a presumption or authorize an infere~nce 
that the defendant's act or omissions proocimateiy 
cause the injury." (See also Walkenhorst v. Kes-
ler, 92 Utah 312, 67 P2 654; Anderson v. Nixon, 
104 Utah 262, 139 P2 216; and 13 ALR 2d 24 to 
the same effect.) 
In her complaint appellant alleged that her injury 
was due to the negligent inje'Ction of some fluid into her 
body and more particularly that her injury was due to 
some fluid which was injected on December 27, 1950: 
"and that on numerous occasions between August 
5, 1950 and December 28, 1950, the defendant and 
his servants, employees and assistants did inject 
various fluids, the nature of which is unknown 
to the plaintiff, into the body of the plaintiff, and 
that on December 27, 1950, the defendant, George 
E. Eason, did. inject in to the plaintiff a liquid, 
the nature of which is unknown to the plaintiff, 
whereby the plaintiff had a convulsion with the re-
sult of a serebral vascular aecident." 
It was also Dr. Day's opinion that plaintiff's condi-
tion was due to a soluble substance being injected into tha 
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system of such a· nature that it could p·ass through the 
veins or the lungs into the circulation system and even-
tually reach the brain. He testified it is possible that t 1il 
in penicillin could reach the brain in such a manner. 
· . There is no evidence in the record that penicilJ Jn 
should not have been used in the· treatment of plaintiff's 
arthritis. There is no evidence that any of the penicillin 
which was injected contained oil or, ~ven assuming that 
it eontained oil, that the· penicillin was pre·pared and 
injected in such a manner that oil might have been intro-
duced into it or the p·resence of oil discovered. F·or aught 
that ap·p~ears in the reeo.rd, pencillin may often he present 
in penicillin injections even when due care is used i~ the 
pre·pa.ration, procuring or injection of.the same. 
·Likewise there is no eyidence that any other fluid 
which was injected into plaintiff's body should not have 
been used in the treatment of plaintiff or that the injec-
tion were prepared or injected in such a manner as to 
cause some soluble substance to be injected into plaintiff's 
body which should either not have been injected or should 
have been discovered in an injection. 
During the past few ye·ars. medical science has de-
veloped a number of "wonder drugs" with great benefit 
to the physical well being of mankind. It is a matter of 
common knowledge that the ·use of the drugs are still in 
what may ·be terminated "somewhat of an experimental 
stage" and that the use· of these drugs quite often produce 
a differe~t rea:ction than expected depending upon the in-
dividual. It may he that pl·aintiff's illness was a reaction 
from one of these medicants. We cannot say that the 
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use of these preparations is, ipso facto, negligent in the 
absence of any evidence as to the wisdom of using them 
or some negligence in the Inanner in which they are han-
dled. 
nforeover, there is no evidence· as to any other afflic-
tion, other tha:n arthritis, 'vhich the plaintiff may or may 
not haYe had, such as hypotension. It may be that plain-
tiff did suffer from one of the other ailments suggested 
by Dr. D·ay such as apoplexy. He·r activities up to the 
tllne of her illness are not explained. It may be that if we 
lmew these activities we could explain the convulsion she. 
suffered on January 2, 1951, five days after her last treat-
ment in the hands of the defendant. We realize the fore-
going conclusions are. highly conjectural and speculative 
but submit that they are as likely as any other conclu-
sion which may_ be drawn on the basis of the evidence 
submitted. 
Appell:ant, ap·parently·.aware o~ the failure of the 
evidence to show defendant to he. negligent in injecting 
any fluid in plaintiff's body, continually refers to the 
occasion when Dr. Eason had difficulty in making an 
injection in plaintiff's left arm -as some e·vidence of negli-
gence. This argument is falacious in a number of re-
spects. 
The action was brought to recover for a cerebral vas-
eula.r accident, an injury to plaintiff's brain, not for any 
injury to plaintiff's arm. The plaintiff alleged an.d he:r 
Doctor asserted her injury was the result of some fluid 
being injected into her body and more. particularly some 
fluid which was injected on December 27 1950. There 
. ' 
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is no causal connection. between her injury and the fact 
that defendant some month and a half before was unable 
to make an injection into the left arm and thereafter 
was compelled to make injections into the right arm. 
Moreover, there was no showing that the defendant 
was negligent in the manner in which he tried to make 
the injection and plain tiff herself testified any injury 
to the arm healed within two weeks, a rnonth before she 
suffered the injury of which she now complains. 
An examination of the record in this case leaves the 
reader with the question. What caused the plaintiff 
to become so violently ill on January 2, five days afte·r 
she had l~ast seen the defendant~ The answer to that 
question is not. to he found in the evidence adduced at 
the trial. To have submitted that question to the jury 
would have been permitted them to indulge in mere con-
jecture and speculation and any conclusion reached would 
have, been pure guess. 
POINT NO. IV. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUS-
TAINING ANY OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S QUESTIONS. 
The plain tiff asked Dr. Day: 
Q. "Now, based upon that particular observa-
tion which you made on January 2, 1951, do you 
have an opinion as to whether or not the evidence 
of injections which you there observed was made 
in a careful and skillful manner of the type of 
the school of medicine which was then in practice 
in Salt Lake City, Utah~" 
He was then asked what that opinion was and the 
question was objected to on the grounds that there was 
no foundation la:id; that there was no allegation in the 
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complaint that plaintiff's condition was due to the manne-r 
of making injections but alleged that her condition was 
the result of fluids being injected into her body; that 
there was no evidence that plaintiff's condition was due 
to the manner of 1naking an injection but that p;Jaintiff's 
own doctor had already testified that it was a rHsult of 
some fluid, oil in penicillin, having been injected; and 
lastly, upon the grolmd that plaintiff was attempting 
to change the theory of her case. 
"It is fundamental that evidence to be admis-
sible must relate and be confined to the matters in 
issue in the case at bar and must tend to prove or 
disprove these matters or be pertinent thereto, or, 
to put it another \vay, the proof must correspond 
to the issues raised by the pleadings. . . . The 
reason for the rule is that such evidence tends to 
dra-\v the minds of the jurors away from the point 
in issue and mislead them; moreover, the adverse 
party having no notice of such coarse of evidence 
is not prepared to rebut it." 20 American Juris-
prudence, page 242. 
The theory on which the case at bar wa.s tried was 
that plaintiff's illness had been caused by the negligent 
injection of some fluid which should not have been in-
jected. This witness had already testified that pJaintiff's 
illness, in his opinion, was due to the injection of some 
substance such as oil. Whether or not the injection was 
1nade in a physically skillful manner was not probative 
of the ulti1nate issue, that is, that defendant negligently 
injected some fluid which caused plaintiff's illness, and 
the information called for was clearly not relevant. 
Moreover, the question was not p~roperly framed in 
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that the court and the jury were not informed upon what 
facts the witness was basing his opinion so that they 
may be in a pos1tion to determine, from the other evi-
dence, what weight should he given to his testimony. 
"When a party seeks to have the opinion of 
an expert witness on the whole or any part of the 
evidence, i't is the duty of the court in the exercise 
of its discretion so to control the form, length, and 
contents of the question that the-re may be no 
abuse of the right to take the witness' opinion. A 
hypothetical question should be p·rop~erly framed, 
sufficiently specific, and clearly stated so that 
the .jury.may know With certainty upon what state 
of ass.wned facts the exp·ert bases his opinion." 
58 American Juris prudence (Witnesses) page 482. 
The witness had already testified in detail as to his 
observations of plaintiff's condition; his review of the 
history 'Of the case, including the manner in which his 
injections were made; the treatment given and pJain-
tiff's ·response .. His opinion was already before the court 
and it affirmatively appeared that the manner in which 
the injections ~ere ma.de did not enter into his opinion or 
have any causal connection with plaintiff's subsequent 
illness. ·The court, therefore, properly, excluded this evi-
dence on this ground. 
"The extent to which the direct examination 
of an expert witness may he carried is largely dis-
-cretionary with the trial court. Questions as to 
matters which have pro~perly been brought out in 
prior testimony of the witness may be excluded." 
58 American Jurisprudence (Witnesses), page 
469. 
In Davis v. United States, 165 U.S .. 373, a doctor 
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who had stated all that he had seen and heard and had 
given his own expert opinion concerning the s·anity of a 
person 'vas asked what medical science taught on a ce.r- · 
tain symptoms which the evidence showed we·re p~resent 
in the person concerning which the doctor was testifying. 
An objection was sustained and the sup;reme court said: 
"rt would seem probably that, inasmuch as the 
Witness had shown himself qualified t.o testify 
as a medieal expert, as he had stated all that he 
had seen and heard, and given his own expe·rt 
opinion thereof, the court deen1ed it improper or 
unnecessary to enter into any examination as to 
what the witness thought medical science would 
say of defendant's conduct and ap~pearance. It 
1nay have been because the matter had been suffi-
ciently brought out in the prior testimony of the 
witness, but probably the reason we have sug-
gested is the correct one, and in that view we are 
of the opinion that the ruling furnishes no ground 
for disturbing the judgment." 
The immateriality of the p·roffered evidence and 
the fact that the exclusion of the same was not prejudicial 
is. best illustrated by assuming an answer favorable for 
the plaintiff. If we assume that the doctor would have 
testified that defendant did not make the injection in 
the skillful manner of the type of the school of medicine 
which was then in practice in Salt Lake City, this evi-
dence does not add anything to plaintiff's case since 
there is absolutely no e:vidence that the manner in which 
the injections were made caused. the illness complained 
of by the plaintiff. 
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. CONCLU1SION 
It is submitted that there is no evidence·of negligence 
on the part of defendant in the diagnosis or treatment of 
pJaintiff. Assuming negligence in some respect, there is 
no causal connection between any act or omission of the 
defendant and the convulsions pilaintiff suffered on Janu-
ary 2, 1952. 
An inference is made that defendant was not quali-
fied to treat the plaintiff whereas the record shows that 
he had graudated from Junior College, a four year n1edi-
cal. school for osteopathic physicians and had had one 
year's practical experience before being allowed to enter 
into p~ractice. It is inferred that the treatment prescribed 
by the defendant was errop.eous and not in accord with 
prescribed medical treatment, but the only evidence in thr 
record is that the treatment was correct. 
Plain tiff alleged in his complaint and tried the case 
on the theory that defendant had negligently injected 
some fluid into plaintiff's body. F'ailing to prove any 
such negligence, appellant attempts to change the theory 
of her case and argue that p·laintiff's injuries were due 
to negligence in the manner in which defendant made the 
injections, a theor:y which was not substantiated by the 
opinion of her own expert witness and which has no 
causal connection with the injury of which she com-
plained. 
The basis of Dr. Day's opinion is that some soluble 
substance, such as oil, which could p·ass through the veins 
and into the lungs and thence into the circulatory syste1n, 
was injected into the pJaintiff. This precludes the physi-
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cal manner of making injections as a p·roxima.te_cause of 
the injuries. Any infection as a result of an unsterile 
needle would have appeared as an infection in the area 
where the injection was n1ade. No such infection ap·-
peared. 
Moreover, the injection on which the appellant places 
·I 
so much stress occurred on November 6, 1951 57 days be-
fore the convulsion which is the injury for which recovery 
is sought and not the arm-occurred. Its remoteness in 
time alone precludes it from being a cause. And there 
is no evidence that any injections were ever made in that 
arm thereafter. Plaintiff herself testified that the arm 
healed in two weeks and that injections were thereafter 
made into the other arm and that the doctor exp-erienced 
no further difficulty. 
There was no evidence that defendant ever made an 
injection into the "manipulated arm" after N oiVember 6, 
1950. As pointed out, plaintiff testified defendant did 
not. Therefore, any evidence as to whether it was good 
medical :P·ractice or not would have been immaterial and 
the exclusion of this evidence was proper, esp~ecially in 
view of the forn1 in which it was presented. 
Respectfully submitted, 
By: 
STEWART, CANNON & HANSON 
REx J. HANSON 
EDWIN B. CANNON 
DoN J. HANSON 
ERNEST F. BALDWIN, JR. 
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